Abstract * Theoretical models like CSP and CCS describe computation using synchronization.
Introduction
When computer systems are operating (e.g., civil air transports, nuclear power generation, etc.), various types of errors can occur both in hardware and in software. The source of such errors may include a wide range of possible failure causalities. For example, untested manufactured imperfections or flaws (like improper floating point division), software design and implementation defects, timing errors, wear down, transient errors induced by radiation, power surges and other environmental factors. The most prevalent types encountered are highly dependent on the kind of system being used, its operating environment, its workload and the system design, manufacture, integration and testing process.
The traditional fault/error/failure model where underlying anomalies (faults) give rise to incorrect values (errors), which may ultimately cause incorrect * Sheldon, an AIAA student member, is currently supported by a NASA (LaRC) Graduate Student Research Fellowship (Grant #NGT-50896).
behavior (failure), need to consider timing and performance issues. Indeed, embedded real-time systems (e.g., often characterized by intense interaction with sensors and actuators) possess the ability to tolerate brief periods of incorrect interaction, either in values exchanged or the timing of exchanges. 14 Taking all these factors into account is a difficult and complex undertaking, yet the systems designed and built today have greater functionality and higher performance.
Indeed such systems, due to the confidence gained from many operational hours and lessons learned, have evolved and been refined into better products. Whether these systems are more robust and have greater reliability is a less obvious question. Assuming they are more reliable, then the question becomes at what price? The challenge is to develop cost effective methods, realistic models, and frameworks for reasoning and evaluating the system under development (prior to building expensive prototypes).
This paper introduces our framework based on the notion that formal mathematically precise methods should be used to design such systems. 1, 13 Thus, given a functional specification of a system and its external constraints (e.g., topology, communications, deadlines), what methods are available for avoiding or tolerating faults/errors and how do they impact the performance and reliability (i.e., performability) of the system. 6 This process can be visualized from Figure 1 . As specifications are refined into detailed designs, the reliability and performance requirements can also be refined to reveal the trade-offs in design alternatives. Using this framework, the specifier/designer can:
Communicating Sequential Processes
The CSP model was developed by Hoare in the early 80's and later, in 1986 extended by Olderog. 5, 12 The basic idea is that systems can readily be decomposed into subsystems which operate concurrently and interact with each other as well as with their common environment (e.g., typical real-time). Parallel composition of such systems is as simple as that of sequential composition using traditional languages (e.g., Pascal). The major benefits of using the CSP model are to avoid many of the problems associated with parallel programming (e.g., shared resources and multi-threading), is a secure mathematical foundation for the avoidance of errors, and for achievement of provable correctness. In addition, CSP provides a complete mathematical definition of the concept of a nondeterministic process which enables modeling of stochastic processes at the Petri net level.
A CSP program consists of n > 1 communicating processes; this is normally represented using the parallel composition operator (||), which is associative: P = {P 1 || P 2 || .....|| P n }. Processes are assumed to have a disjoint set of variables (or local symbols). Processes communicate synchronously by sending and receiving messages: the sending and receiving actions (or events) are indicated using the input (?) and output (!) actions. P i ? x is the action of receiving a value sent by process P i (or received on a channel P i ) into variable x. P j ! <expression> describes the action of sending the value of the expression to P j (or sending on a channel P j ). Synchronization uses complementary input and output commands by two communicating processes (using the same channel). Communication can be made selective by providing guards, where one of the alternative communication actions with a satisfied guard is selected. A guarded command has the general syntax of the form <guard> → <command list>. A command list is a set of commands defining a sequence of actions, alternative actions based on either deterministic or nondeterministic choice, recursive actions, or a STOP action. STOP terminates (or deadlocks) a process. The following summarizes CSP syntax (| means 'or'):
In CSP, capitalized names are process names, and lower case characters denote visible actions. Here, (a → P) means, action 'a' followed by P, (P\b) is the same as P except action b is hidden, (P Q) represents a nondeterministic choice between P and Q, (P Q) represents a deterministic choice between P and Q, ( P|| b Q) shows concurrent processes P and Q that synchronize on action b, (P; Q) a sequence between P and Q, (µX • P) is used for recursion.
For the purpose of reliability or performance analyses, we need not be concerned with the semantic model. Thus, we need focus only on the structural aspects of CSP and give a simple example to illustrate this principle.
The CSP-based Language Primitives
Systems are built from processes. The simplest process is an action (an assignment, input or output). SKIP and STOP are both processes: they both start and perform no action (i.e., engage in no event), but SKIP terminates while STOP does not terminate (ever). Larger processes are built by combining smaller processes in a construction. PAR (or ||), SEQ (or ;), NDC (or ), DC (or ), and MU. (or µX • P) are constructor primitives. The CSP-based grammar (** is a comment) is provided formally as a yacc specification: ** Start symbol = "system" can be an event (or trigger) which causes a process to engage in an action (e.g., a → P). This process is defined as an implication. Input and output require a channel. Channels provide unbuffered, unidirectional point-to-point communication of values between two concurrent processes. A guarded process combines one or more processes, each of which is conditional on an input, a boolean expression or both. An expression can be integer, boolean or relational (boolean expressions must consist of boolean variables prefixed with @). Operands are either integers, variables, or integer or relational expressions (distinct from boolean).
Stochastic Petri Nets
The Petri net (PN) in its simplest form is a directed bipartite graph, where the two types of nodes are known as places (circles) and transitions (bars).
Places normally represent events while transitions represent actions. A transition is enabled if all its inputs contain at least one token (dark spot inside a place). When a transition is enabled, it can fire, leading the PN into a different marking.
A marking represents the configuration of tokens in the places of the PN, it is the state of the PN. A marking is reachable if it is obtained by a sequence of firings starting in the initial marking. The reachability graph is the set of all reachable markings connected by arcs representing the transition firings. In a stochastic PN, each transition has an associated firing time, which can be zero (immediate) or exponentially distributed with a parameter dependent on the marking (timed).
Completion of the action defined by a transition causes a token to be assigned to each of its output places. When a place is the input to several transitions, only one of the transitions is enabled based on a nondeterministic choice. If several conflicting immediate transitions are enabled in a marking, a firing probability must be defined. A specification must be given for every maximally fireable subset of conflicting transitions in each vanishing marking (marking with at least one immediate transition; otherwise it's tangible). As transitions are enabled, the state of the PN moves from marking to marking. An inhibitor arc prevents a transition's firing when its corresponding input place is enabled (such arcs can model zero testing).
A Stochastic PN (SPN) describes an underlying stochastic process, captured by the "extended reachability graph" (ERG), a reachability graph with additional stochastic information on the arcs. The ERG has been shown to be reducible to a Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC). 10 Since a SPN permits a probability distribution to be associated with arcs (or transitions) they are very suitable for modeling system performance and reliability. Thus, each transition is associated with a random variable that expresses the delay from the enabling to the firing of the transition. When multiple transitions are enabled, the transition with a minimum delay fires first. When the random variable is exponential, the markings of the SPN are isomorphic to the states of a CTMC. The transition rate from state M i to M j = qij is given by q ij = l i1 + l i2 + . . .+l im where l ik is the delay in firing a transition t k which takes the Petri net from marking M i to M j (when several transitions enable the firing from M i to M j ). See [4 and 11] for more details and a survey of PNs.
Mapping CSP to Petri Nets
An initial set of rules for translating CSP specifications into Petri nets (PNs) is defined in [8] . The rules are based on the fact that in the CSP model processes move from one action to another. The activities which enable the actions of processes can be viewed as events which are represented by places, while the actions are viewed as transitions. Some example translations are shown in Figures 2 and 3 . A PN translation from a CSP specification need not be unique since we must introduce dummy places or transitions to maintain its bipartite nature. Intuitively, it is possible to reduce different PN equivalents into a canonical form. Our goal is to demonstrate the feasibility of translating between CSP and PNs so that stochastic properties deduced at the PN level can be specified back at the CSP level. An example of this method is provided to demonstrate the process. † The translations between the CSP and Petri net models have not been formally verified to be isomorphic.
Stochastic Analysis: A Brief Example
One of the major objectives of our research is to provide assistance to the user in specifying not only functionality but also reliability, performance and execution deadlines. In this paper we show how this is facilitated by the translation of CSP specifications into SPNs. Major benefits include how the PN structure can facilitate discovery of potential design flaws and other weaknesses that may lead to critical/non-critical failures and timing dependencies. In the example below a timing dependency makes necessary additional synchronization to avoid a safety-critical failure.
The CSP for a Train Crossing
At the intersection the gate closes for arriving trains and remains closed until the train has completely passed by. The problem statement can be extended to handle multiple trains, but only one train is specified here (Appendix A has a CSP-based version):
Two concurrent processes, the TRAIN and the GATE communicate via two activity messages. The TRAIN outputs "a" (arriving) to the GATE when it is about to arrive at the intersection. Just before it has passed through the intersection, it sends a "d" (departed) to the GATE. The GATE process receives the "a" and closes the gate. Once closed, the GATE waits for an input of "d" before opening.
Recent extensions to CSP permit the association of time with actions. Because CSP uses point-to-point communication it is awkward to describe the case where the GATE process accepts inputs from multiple TRAIN processes. A hazard exists since the TRAIN process could transition to AT_INTERSECTION before the gate closes, which is unsafe. Likewise, the train may depart while the gate remains closed (viewed as fail-safe behavior). The PN translation in Figure 4 reveals these flaws more readily.
Petri Net for the Tr ain Crossing
The train and gate operate independently but must communicate to accomplish their respective missions (i.e., passing through the intersection and blocking traffic to permit the train to pass safely). In Figure 4 the messages being exchanged are represented by places P5 and P6. The gate will not begin to close until it receives the approaching message.
This process involves markings M3 (send approaching msg.), M4 (msg. received but gate is open), M5 (gate begins to close), and M6 (gate closed). In all four markings (M3-6) the train is "approaching" which constitutes safe conditions. Markings M cf and M tf show that the train is at the intersection but the gate is not closed. In M cf either a mechanical or a communication "hard" failure has occurred. In both cases the result is unsafe (i.e., critical failure [cf]). While in M tf a timing failure has occurred.
Constructing the PN and deriving the feasible markings reveals that the train process could enter the intersection before the gate closes. If we assume that the gate always opens and closes sooner than the time it takes the train to reach the crossing, the PN can be viewed as hazard free (except for the possibility of an unsafe mechanical failure). Obviously some mechanism is needed to ensure the train will not proceed unless the gate is closed. We could redesign the system to force the train to wait until the gate completes closing which would provide a failsafe environment. Neither timing nor hard failures could cause an unsafe condition if additional synchronization provided an acknowledgment be sent back to the train stating the gate is closed. Thus, the train would not proceed past some critical stopping distance to the gate unless the acknowledgment was received. Incidentally, this only works if we assume only one train can approach until the current train has departed. If this assumption is not made, another train could rear end the train waiting to receive an acknowledgment which itself could possibly be lost! Thus, failure of any communication related actions may lead to a deadlock (train halts), but synchronization between the train and gate eliminates the possibility of trains passing through the intersection un-guarded by an open gate. Failure to open the gate is not safety critical, yet should be avoided to prevent congestion of the associated infrastructure. It may be possible to use Reward nets (and performability analyses) to associate a cost with delays in opening the gate. 6,7
Failure Modes of the Train
In the PN of Figure 4 , all transitions can fail and we permit at most one token at a place. The Markings demonstrate that there are two unique manifestations of failures (i.e., critical and non-(safety)-critical).
To illustrate the significance of timing correctness we group both communication and mechanical failures into M cf and show M tf separately (tf for timing failure, which is also critical). Mnc groups all three types of (non-critical) failure mechanisms together! Why should these different mechanisms be given separate markings (or states in the corresponding Markov state diagram)? It is important to understand (1) how a failure occurs (its cause) in order to prevent, avoid or mask faults/errors, (2) to realize how much they may Markings: P 1 P 2 P 3 P 4 P 5 P 6 P 7 P 8 P 9 P 10 P 11 P 12 Description of marking (i.e., state of the system) M1:
( 1 Missing from the PN are the corresponding places P cf , P tf , and P nc that consume the failed transition's token. When a transition fails to fire properly, the token is consumed but does not fall into an operational place. Instead, the token causes a failure transition to fire and the token is placed in this transition's output place. For simplicity's sake these transitions and places have been omitted. When constructing the corresponding CTMC (or discrete time Markov chain, DTMC) the failure states are not omitted since they have been designated by a unique marking. Yet, in order to recognize what states can directly transition to a failure (or absorbing) state, the arcs must be drawn so that their respective failure transition rates (or probability for DTMC) can be considered.
The CSP specification (and the corresponding PN) can be augmented to show how such failures should be handled. For example, the communication failures can be handled using time-out and re-transmit techniques. But still, should the gate fail to close then the question becomes what can be done to possibly avoid catastrophe? Perhaps an audible and visual alarm would help to alert unsuspecting pedestrians and traffic.
Pa rametric Sensitivity Analysis
Using conventional techniques such as those used by stochastic PN tools (e.g., SPNP3), discrete and continuous analyses can be performed. § For the purpose of this presentation, we have computed reliability of the train crossing with different failure rates (or probabilities) and service rates (e.g., speed of the train, rate at which the gate mechanism operates). The values used in this paper (and hence the results of the analysis) are only for illustrating the approach. It is not our intention to attach significance to the failure rates, MTTFs obtained, or the probability of detected and undetected failures. These analyses are useful in exploring different fault-handling mechanisms and the cost-benefit of providing fault tolerance. In the four subsections below we describe our approach to parametric sensitivity using the results of train crossing analysis. The following topics are covered: (1) timing failure probability (analytical derivation), (2) cost function minimization, (3) discrete and (4) continuous Markov reliability analysis.
Timing Failure Probability
Analysis of failure rates (and cost functions) requires knowledge of the probability density functions (pdfs) associated with the train travel time and the gate closing time. ¶ Lets assume that the pdf for the train travel time (θ) is given by P θ (θ), and the pdf for the gate closing time (η) is P η (η). The joint pdf of θ and η is P θ,η (θ,η). If θ and η are statistically independent then P θ,η (θ,η)= P θ (θ)P η (η). In this case, since both the train and gate operate independent of each other, it can safely be assumed that their probabilities are independent. The failure condition occurs iff, θ < η (i.e., when the train arrival time is less than the gate closing time). Thus, the probability of failure is,
Since θ and η are statistically independent then, § The classic steady-state solution method for stochastic models that maps GSPN models to CTMCs is compared with a method based on DTMCs in [4] . The DTMC method is shown to perform best (sometimes). ¶ The train travel (or arrival) time begins from when the message is transmitted (to the gate) and ends when the train arrives at the intersection where the gate has closed.
Where, F θ (η) is the probability distribution function of the train arrival time and presents the probability that θ < η (the gate closing time). The same result can be obtained using conditional probabilities. Lets assume that the gate closing time is fixed and given as Η, then the probability of failure can be given as
Again, if θ and η are statistically independent, then,
The total probability of failure would then be,
which is the same as (1). In a real circumstance, the pdf of θ and η would be known based on empirical knowledge, but this was not the case for our train example. Yet, lets consider some plausible analytical pdf from the stand point of an engineer who is responsible to procure such a system.
Typically the railroad tracks have a set speed limit that would determine the distance from the gate at which the "close gate" message must be transmitted. This distance must be set so as to reasonably assure that enough time will elapse for the gate to close. If the speed of the train was constant, then the train arrival time will be a constant. ** However, there will be some variability from one run to the next which, over a period of say 25 years (with say five trains/day), represents a fair amount of uncertainty. The sources of variability (e.g., prevailing winds and other weather effects, time of the day, weight, type of load, and various human factors) can be grouped together as "undetermined" random events. Lets assume that if no random events occur, then the arrival time would be some nominal value, call it MPT (for most probable arrival time). Lets also assume that the deviation around MPT (we'll use lower case mpt to shorten equations) is not symmetrical and the pdf of the deviation is exponential given by, ** The time taken by the train to pass by the intersection (once it has arrived) is ignored since that is dependent on the length of the train and is independent from the design parameters for the Train Crossing.
Where p e is the probability of train being earlier than mpt, β 2 is the variance of being early. In addition, we'll assume the pdf for the gate p(η), is similar except that different parameter values (i.e., different p e , β, and mpt). Figure 5 shows the pdf for the train travel time for mpt=40, β=4, and pe=0.1. Note, the area under the curve for mpt<θ< ∞ is 0.9. In Figure 6 the probability distribution of θ (F θ (Θ) )is shown. Where F θ (Θ) is the probability of train travel time being less than Θ. The joint pdf of θ and η is shown in Figure 7 . Note that the probability of failure is the volume under that part of the surface where θ < η. This is shown in the figure 7 by cutting the surface with plane P. The p(θ<η) is the volume under the foreground surface. The failure probability is calculated according to equation (1) with parameters values substituted.
Cost Functions
A cost function is especially useful for trading-off the optimal values of design parameters. The function itself relates a cost to some tangible property of the system (e.g., time, reliability, failures, etc.). And, in general, calculating the probability of failure is most useful in understanding the balance between reliability and the cost of failure. The cost function should be defined with parameters that can be measured and/or altered to minimize the potential losses (or costs). For example, more elaborate fault-handling and faultrecovery mechanisms could be used to tolerate or prevent safety critical failures, while less attention may be paid to non-safety critical failures. Failure to open the gate may cause long delays for waiting traffic but such failures can be handled by providing less expensive mechanisms that will allow the gate to be opened manually. Conversely, failure to close the gate is more severe, so the benefit of using more elaborate mechanisms (e.g., increased redundancy, testing, and verification) is worth the expense to ensure the system uses an inherently more reliable design. This equation implies that there is an initial cost associated with installing the gate and the cost of the gate rises as the speed of the gate increases. The value of denominator represents the number of times that the gate operates before it needs to be replaced. It should be noted that this is a hypothetical equation for demonstration purpose and it is not based on any empirical knowledge. In fact, the actual function includes many more parameters.
The cost function is a multidimensional function of all the parameters of the system (mpt, gmpt, β, β g , p e , p eg [g subscript stands for gate parameters]). In a practical situation a subset of these parameters has to be selected by the designer in such a way to minimize the overall cost of operating the system. For smaller values of mpt and larger values of gmpt the cost is mostly influenced by the cost of failure (mpt= 30 and gmpt= 30). For small values of gmpt (such as gmpt= 10) the cost is mostly influenced by both the cost associated with delaying traffic (i.e., delay cost increases as the train travel time increases) and the cost to build a gate that can close faster. If the designer has the choice of selecting both mpt and gmpt, then the optimal point will be mpt≅ 45 and gmpt≅ 25. Table 2 presents the probability assignments for our test runs of the train crossing ignoring deadline related failures (i.e., P tf = 0). Four different trials were run with differing failure probabilities (where P c = communication failure, P m = mechanical failure either in opening or closing). In all runs P m > P c , and in order to reduce the probability of critical failure in runs 2 -4, we set P m (close) > P m (open) by the factors of 100, 3 and 5 respectively. Hypothetically, using fault-tolerant methods, such reliability improvements are possible. Consequently, the probability of critical failures (P cf ) are reduced by the factors of 17.573, 1.975 and 2.974 respectively. Such analyses showing the magnitude of improvement associated with a given design (or specification) option can be useful for deciding what level of fault tolerance is appropriate (a practical approach especially in light of budgets and schedules). Note, P ncf is the noncritical failure probability and the MTTF is given in the number of discrete steps (or time units). 
Discrete Analysis

Continuous Analysis
The results of the continuous analysis are shown in Figure 10 . These results are based on the CTMC shown in Figure 9 . In the CTMC states represented by the markings M1, M2, M6, and M7 are so called "safe" because these states are transient and do not (directly) give rise to failures (do not transition to absorbing states). The mechanical (λ m ), communication (λ c ) and timing (τ) failure rates are shown associated with their transition arcs. The trade-off between the rate of train arrivals (µ 1 ), speed of the train (µ 3 ), rate of the gate mechanism (µ 6 , µ 9 ) and the failure rates were investigated.
The unreliability of communications do not significantly impact the MTTFs because we have set those failure rates much lower than the rates associated with the gate's open/close mechanism by a factor of 1,000 times (i.e., λ m = 0.0001 > λ c = 0.0000001). Mechanical failures and the possibility of the gate not closing (opening) in time are assumed to be greater looking at the data (input parameters and the results incontributors to the unreliability of the system. In Figure 10 ) an interesting relation is evident. We observe that, if the train's speed tends to bring it to the intersection sooner than the gate has had time to close, then an improvement in the gate's mechanical reliability doesn't really help! To improve the overall system's reliability it is more important to provide the additional synchronization between the train and gate processes as described in ¶3.1, so as to avoid the possibility of having the gate miss its deadline (τ 5 ).
In general, it is interesting and (perhaps) important to see how much the least reliable entity impacts the overall system reliability. In Figure 10 , there are incremental improvements seen in Rel [10, 000] (the reliability of the system at 10,000 time units) from 10 -40 to 10 -5 (see how τ 5 has been manipulated in runs 1 -3), but by run 4 we have reached a point of diminishing return. The next most significant gain in system reliability comes when the gate's failure rate is improved by a factor of ten (note the difference between run 6 and 7 in the graph). In this case, the MTTF improves by 6 times while the corresponding system reliability improves significantly from ~2.6x10 -5 tõ 3.3x10 -1 .
Summary and Future Work
The objective of this paper was to show how CSP specifications are translated into SPNs for the purpose of reliability and performance analyses. Such translations will give insight into the failure modes, and how fault handling mechanisms can be described as a part of the CSP specification.
This approach provides feedback to the designer so that a judicious cost-benefit analysis for providing fault-avoidance and fault-tolerance can be made. We have illustrated this approach by using a simple example. The failure probabilities used in this example (hence the results of the analysis) are for illustrating our approach, no other significance should be attached, the intention being to show the complete process of specification and analysis. A tool is currently being developed for automatically translating CSP specifications based on the grammar discussed in ¶2.1, into PNs in order to use off-the-shelf SPN tools for the analysis.
Appendix A
This specification is based on the original CSP formulated Train example described in ¶3.1. The CSPbased grammar is found in ¶2.1.1. The '--' denotes a comment , PROCESS is a key word declarative, braces are grouping connectives defining process boundaries. Process lists require processes be separated by commas when contained in constructors (i.e., SEQ, PAR, etc.) primarily for readability. A semicolon completes a process declaration and the period completes the system declaration (1st symbol, "TrainXing" below).
By convention, we define processes first and use a process constructor to specify their interaction. The {Arrive, Depart} in the last line, are synchronizing messages for the preceding Train and Gate processes. Since both are predefined, subsequent reference uses a process call syntax "Process()." View the parentheses as connoting the existence of a body of events and actions. 
COMPREHENSIVE MOTIVATION
• Why should we be interested in reliability prediction? √ Safety critical nature of some systems. √ High cost of loss due to failure. √ Ability to evaluate design implementation models (candidate prototypes). √ Ability to make design trade-offs. • Stochastic models are not useful in specifying functionality.
• Is it possible to translate between formal models and stochastic models to address both aspects of systems?
• Need to relate non-functional requirements at user (top) level specifications. √ Evaluate cost of providing a required level of reliability or performance.
• Need to develop tools to achieve the translation between the models.
BODY OF CORE APPROACHES GENERAL PROPERTIES OF REAL-TIME SYSTEMS
Event Driven Resource Limited Dynamic schedule Time Driven Resource Adequate Static Schedule
Asynchronous Synchronous
Based on the requirements of a given system there is generally a strong need for (1) reproducible determinism, (2) determinism that only guarantees meeting deadlines, and (3) priority based solutions up to a very general means of providing time-value or benefit accrual based mechanisms. WHY USE CSP?
• CSP as a formal specification method gives rigor . . . . √ Mathematical abstraction of process interactions (i.e., communication, concurrency, recursion, etc.), √ Rules to help in the implementation of processes (i.e., laws used to prove a specification is satisfied), √ How processes can be composed together into systems where components interact internally and with their environment, √ Definition of a mathematical theory for deterministic and nondeterministic processes, √ Algebraic laws which describe the essential properties of the various operations that are useful in expressing new problems, solutions and proofs.
• However, for our purposes . . . . √ Demonstrate the concept using CSP because it is restricted, simple, concurrency constructs are generic, and the availability of occam. √ The CSP-based grammar does not restrict considering CSP properties, however we are interested only that the structural properties be preserved. √ Introduction of stochastic properties into that formally rigorous specification environment. • A Transition is enabled for execution only when all input places contain at least one token.
• When a transition completes execution, one token from each input place is removed and a new token is added to each output place. • Identifying system failure modes by inspecting the Petri nets.
• How the identified failure mode can be handled.
• How to specify the appropriate fault handling mechanism (e.g., additional synchronization, time-out-retransmit) back at the CSP level (to be examined by the user/specifier).
• Analysis of Petri nets for reliability using analytically derived (user-based) timing failure probabilities. A SIMPLE COMPLETE EXAMPLE: RAILROAD CROSSING Two Basic Properties the system must satisfy**: (1) Safety property -the gate is down during all occupancy intervals (2) Utility property -the gate is open when no train is in the crossing. Our solution in general terms: Two Processes: The TRAIN and the GATE • TRAIN sends an "arriving" signal to the GATE as it nears the intersection and proceeds towards the intersection.
• GATE, upon receiving the signal, closes the gate and remains closed until the train departs.
• TRAIN sends a "departing" signal after leaving the intersection.
• GATE, upon receiving the signal opens the gate and remains open.
• The two processes repeat continuously. T r a in g o n e , g a t e o p e n T r a in in t r a n s it , g a t e o p e n T r a in s e n d s a r r iv in g m s g , g a t e o p e n R e c e iv e a r r iv in g m s g , g a t e o p e n S t a r t g a t e c lo s in g T r a in a p p r o a c h in g , g a t e c lo s e d T r a in a t in t e r s e c t io n , g a t e c lo s e d T r a in g o n e , d e p a r t in g m e s s a g e s e n t R e c e iv e d d e p a r t m s g , g a t e s t il l c lo s e d .
S t a r t g a t e o p e n in g TIMING FAILURE PROBABILITY PARAMETRIC SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS The same result can be obtained using conditional probabilities. Lets assume that the gate closing time is fixed and given as Η, then the probability of failure can be given as
which is the same as (1). • The probability of failure is the volume under that part of the surface where θ < η is shown on left.
• By cutting the surface with plane P, the p(θ<η) can be seen as the volume under the surface in the foreground (shown on right). The pdf for the train travel time (q) is given by Pq(q), and the pdf for the gate closing time (h) is Ph(h). The joint pdf of q and h is Pq,h(q,h). If q and h are statistically independent then Pq,h(q,h)= Pq(q)Ph(h). In this case, since both the train and gate operate independent of each other, it can safely be assumed that their probabilities are independent. The failure condition occurs iff, q < h (i.e., when the train arrival time is less than the gate closing time). • Evaluate (judiciously) the costs (and benefits) for providing fault-avoidance and/or fault-tolerance using a cost function to optimize design parameters. • In all runs P m > P c , and in order to reduce the probability of critical failure in runs 2 -4, we set P m (close) > P m (open) by the factors of 100, 3 and 5 respectively.
• Consequently, the probability of critical failures (P cf ) are reduced by the factors of 17.573, 1.975 and 2.974 respectively. 
